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October 30, 1981 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 81-451 
HATHORN (Mayor), et al. Cert to Miss. S. Ct. (Broom 
for the court) 
v. 
LOVORN, et al. State/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr contests decision of the court below that 
co~pliance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 u.s.c. 
§l973c, was unnecessary • 
FACTS: Since 1960, the Board of Trustees of the Louisville 
Municipal Separate School District has 
CP1~ wl e y P /-D ~ 'Sa MMt:c-8 N'lfe_tsQ..r. 
J,as 11/1--eacl:; .i~t ..... ~1!1U"<:.Ttc£ 
"' 
been composed of five 







members, three of whom are appointed by the governing authorities 
of the City of Louisville and two of whom are elected by the 
qualified electors of the school district living outside the 
city. Resps brought this action, seeking to change the method 
and manner of election. They relied on Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-
203, which provided in relevant part: " in any county in 
which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire 
county in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect, one (1) trustee 
shall be elected from each supervisor's district." (Emphasis 
added.) It was undisputed that this section referred only to 
Winston County, the area covered by the Louisville Municipal 
Separate School District. 
Resps sought to enforce this provision and the election of 
one trustee from each supervisor's district. They also contended 
that the method for selecting trustees violated the one-man, one-
vote principle and unconstitutionally diluted the vote of 
individuals residing outside the Louisville city limits. Resps' 
complaint was dismissed in the Chancery Court of Winston County; 
the chancellor ruled that §37-7-203 violated the state 
constitution and that resps' equal protection rights were not 
being violated under the one-man, one-vote rule. 
On appeal, the ~ ss. s. Ct. reversed. See Lovorn v. 
Hathorn, 365 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1978) (Lee for the court), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979). ' The court agreed that §37~7-203 was 
unconstitutional in part: the portion underscored above, which 
referred to Highways 14 and 15, established a classification that 








local and private law in violation of the state constitution. 
But the court reversed the chancellor's holding that the section 
was impermissible in toto. 
Although recognizing the one-man, one-vote problem, the 
court found Ko need to reach that issue. It reversed the 
chancellor's decree, rendered judgment for resps, and remanded to 
the Chancery Court for election of one school board trustee from 
each supervisor's district. 
Pursuant to the S. Ct.'s mandate, the Chancery Court 
outlined election procedures and ordered that they be submitted 
to the U.S. Attorney General or the DC for the District of 
Columbia in accordance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 u.s.c. §1973c. That section provides that states or political 
subdivisions seeking to enact or administer any election practice 
different from that in effect on Nov. 1, 1972, may enforce that 
change only after acquiring a declaratory judgment from the 
D.D.C. that the change does not have the purpose or effect of 
impermissibly denying the right to vote on the basis of race, or 
after securing the approval of the Attorney General. 
A response from the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil 
I 
Rights Division indicated that the Dep't of Justice did object to -- ------
the proposed change. Specifically, the AG criticized the 
requirement that candidates win a majority of votes, a unique 
. 
feature among county-wide school board elections in the state. 
The AG noted that approximately 39% of the Winston County 
population was black, but that blacks did not constitute a 
majority in any of the five supervisor's districts. The AG could 
('" - -
- 4 -
., not conclude that the new provisions would not have a 
discriminatory effect, and he advised the petrs that the changes 
in the election procedure were legally unenforceable • 
~ 
, 
After additional hearings, the chancellor decreed that the 
election would remain in force subject to compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act and postponed the election. 
DECISION BELOW: Resps appealed to the Miss. S. Ct., which 
held that the chancellor had properly imposed a majority vote 
run-off requirement: §37-7-203 provides that the election at 
issue shall be held in the same manner as is provided in Miss. 
Code Ann. §37-7-217, which requires a majority vote. 
But the court ruled that the lower court had erred in 
mandating compliance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The S. 
Ct. noted that its prior opinion, which was the law of the case 
and which this Court had declined to review, had remanded the 
case for further proceedings and had thereby directed the 
Chancery Court to call an election pursuant to §37-7-203, which 
incorporates by reference the majority vote requirement. The 
matter need not be submitted again to the AG or the D.D.C., the 
court concluded. 
The court therefore affirmed the chancellor's order except 
for the portion relating to the Voting Rights Act, and it ordered 
that an election be held pursuant to §37-7-203. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the Miss. S. Ct. does not 
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ignore the objection of the AG. Petrs rely on this Court's 
opinion from last Term in McDaniel v. Sanchez, No. 80-180 (June 
1, 1981), in which the Court required preclearance of a 
reapportionment plan even though a DC had ordered redistricting 
to remedy a constitutional violation. The Court held: 
"[W]henever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting 
the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people--
no matter what constraints have limited the choices available to 
them--the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is 
applicable." Slip op., at 22. Petrs point out that this Court's 
denial of cert may not be considered an adjudication on the 
merits of the §5 preclearance requirement or an approval of the 
Miss. S. Ct.'s prior opinion. 
DISCUSSION: The court below did not explain its finding 
that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was not required, and 
petrs seem to have a valid complaint. Under McDaniel, supra, the 
t 
only exception to the preclearance requirement appears to apply 
to changes in election procedures ordered by federal district 
courts. A response would. be helpful, and one has been re~ sted. 
There is no response. 
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On application to 
essential facts upon w$ ich they base their request. Rather they 
1/ 
incorporate by reference their cert petn,- which contests the decision 
17See No. 81-451, List 3~ Sheet 3, Oct. 30, 1981 Conf. On 
October 26, the Court called for a response to the cert petn. The 
response, due Nov. 25, has not yet been filed. 
Jt~, Tlit!.. Sf.rf. 1 u..t1l-e$~ ih e 01"J-i#r Ju..:.t,,~ .. $l"f''1.A..-
{ f'IC.. (, ~ ~ d t 4> t,... 7 c.... Sz.t M.M..--:J ,-..t.. v <-r-s..__.( <Lr t> .,.,,. .. r< '"} 
I .,..-1',./-c .-, 
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of the court below that compliance with §5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §l973c, is unnecessary. 
The cert petn reveals that since 1960, the Board of Trustees 
of the Louisville Municipal Separate School District has been com-
posed of five members, three of whom are a,Ppointed by the governing 
authorities of the City of Louisville and two of whom are elected 
by the qualified electors of the school district living outside the 
city. Resps brought this action, s~eking to change the method and 
manner of election to allow for the election of one trustee from -- - ~---------------------each supervisor's district. They contended that the method for 
...____- ...,_._....., -._. 
selecting trustees violated the one-man, one-vote principle and 
unconstitutionally diluted the vote of individuals residing outside 
the Louisville city limits. Resps' complaint was dismissed in the 
Chancery Court of Winston County. However, the Miss. S.Ct. reversed, 
rendered judgment for resps and remanded to the Chancery Court for 
election of one school board trustee from each supervisor's district 
(365 So. 2d 947). 
946 (1979)). 
Subsequently, this Court denied cert (441 U.S. 
Pursuant to the Miss. S.Ct.'s mandate, the Chancery Court 
outlined election procedures and ordered that they be submitted to 
the U.S. Attorney General or the DC for the District of Columbia 
in accordance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
2/ 
§1973c.-
2/That section provides that states or political subdivisions 
seeking to enact or administer any election practice different from 
that in effect on Nov. 1, 1972, may enforce that change only after 
acquiring a declaratory judgment from the D.D.C. that the change 
does not have the purpose or effect of imperrnissibly denying the 
right to vote on the basis of race, or after securing the approval 
of the Attorney General. 
- -- 3 -
' A response from the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil 
Rights Division indicated that the Dept. of Justice did object - -to the proposed change. Specifically, the AG criticized the require-
ment that candidates win a majority of votes, a unique feature among 
county-wide school board elections in the state. The AG noted that 
I 
approximately 39 % of the Winston County population was black, but 
that blacks did not constitute a majority in any of the five super-
v i sor's districts. The AG could not c;nclude that the new provisions 
would not have a discriminatory effect, and he advised the petrs 
that the changes in the election procedure were legally unenforceable. 
After additional hearings, fue chancellor decreed that the 
election would remain in force subject to compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act and postponed the election. 
DECISION BELOW: Resps appealed to ·the Miss. S.Ct., it held 
that the chancellor had properly imposed a majority vote run-off 
requirement based on Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-203, which provides that 
the election at issue shall be held in the same manner as is provided 
in Miss. Code Ann. §37-7-217~ which requires a majority vote. 
But the court ruled that the lower court had erred in mandating 
compliance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act. Th e Miss. S.Ct. noted 
-- -------- '--that its pr i or opinion, which was the law of t he case and which this 
Court had declined to review on cert, had remanded the case for 
further proceedings and had thereby directed t he Chancery Court to 
call an election pursuant to §37-7-203, which incorporates by 
reference the majority vote requirement. The matter need not be 
submitted again to the AG or · the D.C.C., the court concluded. 
- -- 4 -
·The court therefore affirmed the chancellor's order except 
for the portion relating .to the Voting Rights Act, and it ordered 
that an election be held pursuant to §37-7-203. 
CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: Petrs contend that the Miss. s ·.ct. 
does not have the authority to order noncompliance· with §1973c and to 
I 
ignore the objection of the AG. See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 68 L.Ed 2d 
724 (1981), where this Court required preclearance of a reapportion-
ment even though a DC had ordered redistricting to remedy a constitu-
tional violation. Secondly, they contend that this Court's denial of 
cert may not be considered an adjudication on the merits of the §5 
preclearance requirement, or an approval of the Miss. S.Ct. 's prior 
ll 
opinion. 
PETRS' CONTENTIONS ON THE APPLICATION: Essentially petrs rely 
___, 
on their arguments advanced on the merits ·. However they advise that 
they cannot await a dec•ision on· cert if ·they are to avoid further 
expense of money and efforts ih preparation for the Dec. 5 election. 
To this argument they simply add that the Dept. of Justice disapproved 
the change in election procedure. Accordingly they aver that a grant 
of cert followed by a reversal of the decision below is likely; and 
they maintain that irreparable harm will result absent a stay. 
RESPS' CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS: Resps make the following 
arguments: (1) that a grant of cert is unlikely because this Court 
previously denied cert in this case earlier on the same questions; 
(2) that regarding the merits, the AG's only objection to the elec-
tion is the requirement that a candidate obtain a majority, rather 
than a plurality, of votes; the possibility that a candidate will 
receive a plurality and not a majority is speculative; (3) that any 
l/Resps' brief in opposition is due November 25. 
- -- 5 -
alleged harm noted by applicants is mitigated by the tardiness of 
their application since they could have sought a stay immediately 
after the June 3 Miss . S . Ct. decision; and (4) that the balance of 
equities favor denying a stay since substantial time and money have 
already been expended in preparation for the elect~on. 
I 
DISCUSSION: Resps have presented a reasonable argument regard-
ing the equities of this application. Substantial time and money no 
doubt have been expended in preparation for the election--and there 
is nc apparent reason why applicants could not have aided in avoiding 
such expense by filing their stay application soon after the June 3 
Miss. S.Ct. decision. However, neither party advises whether such 
expense would in fact be lost if the election were stayed; certainly, 
most would not. 
Resps' argument on the merits, however, seems insubstantial. 
Resps acknowledge that the AG objects to· the election change; but 
they argue that the objection is limited to a factor that is not 
likely to occur, i.e., that a candidate will receive a plurality, 
and not majority, of votes. - This Court need not engage in such 
speculation since the fact remains that the AG did lodge an objection. 
As such, any election would be jnviolation of the Voting Rights Act. 
Resps further contend that a grant of cert and reversal are 
unlikely because of this Court's previous denial of cert in this 
case. At first glance such an argument would seem to have some 
validity. However, it seems that the significant factual difference 
between the present petn and the earlier case is the intervening 
AG objection dated March 28, 1980. 
• - -- 6 -
Since the response to the cert ~etn is due Nov. 25, the 
Court conceivably could reach a decison on the cert petn at the 
Dec. 4 Conference--one day before the election. However such 
action would certainly impose substantial hardship on the parti~s. 
I recommend that the application for stay ))e granted pending review -of the cert petn. 
There is a response. 
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~ - From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: 5/<X.9/'8 :J.. 
Recirculated: _ _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPRE1\1E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ 0o 
No. 81-451 
RALPH HATHORN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
MRS. BOBBY LOVORN, ET AL. 
}Lf~ 
~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF a.,,;. ~ 
MISSISSIPPI ~ 
})-~ - - 7 [June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ ~ 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a state court may Cl~~ 
order implementation of a change in election procedure over tf ~-• . 
objections that the change is subject to preclearance under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 1 
' Section 5 provides in relevant part: 
"Whenever a [covered] State or political subdivision ... shall enact or 
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that 
in force or effect on November 1, 1964, ... such State or subdivision may 
institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard , practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and ~ill not 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f)(2) of this title , and unless and until the court enters such judgment 
no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply ~ith such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, 
That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may 





be enforced ~ithout such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal offi- / _ 
cer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attor-~ 
ney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection 
~ithin sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to fa-
cilitate an expedited approval \\ithin sixty days after such submission, the ~






HATHORN i-. LOVORN 
I 
-
Since 1960, the Louisville School District has been coexten-
sive with Winston County, Mississippi. Until last Decem-
ber, the Louisville mayor and city aldermen appointed three 
of the five members of the District's Board of Trustees, and 
Winston County voters residing outside Louisville elected 
the other two members. 
In 1964, the Mississippi legislature enacted a statute pro-
viding in part: 
"The boards of trustees of all municipal separate 
school districts created under the provisions of Article 1 
of this chapter, either with or without added territory, 
shall consist of five (5) members, each to be chosen for a 
term of five (5) years, but so chosen that the term of of-
fice of one (1) member shall expire each year. . . . [I]n 
any county in which a municipal separate school district 
embraces the entire county in which Highways 14 and 15 
intersect, one (1) trustee shall be elected from each su-
pervisors district. " Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-203(1) 
(Supp. 1981). 
Winston County is the only Mississippi county in which High-
ways 14 and 15 intersect. Officials in that county never im-
plemented § 37-7-203(1) because they believed the statute's 
reference to Highways 14 and 15 violated a state constitu-
tional prohibition against local, private, or special 
legislation. 2 
be made ... . " 79 Stat. 439, as amended , 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. 
Section 4 of the Act , 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b, defines 
covered jurisdictions. 
2 Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 90 provides: 
"The legislature shall not pass local , private , or special laws in any of the 
following enumerated cases, but such matters shall be provided for only by 
general Jaws, viz. 
"(p) Providing for the management or support of any private or common 
-
81-451-OPINION 
HATHORN v. LOVORN 
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3 
In 1975, five Winston County voters filed an action in the 
Chancery Court of Winston County, 3 seeking to enforce the 
neglected 1964 state statute. 4 These plaintiffs, respondents 
here, named numerous Louisville and Winston County offi-
cials as defendants. The Chancery Court dismissed re-
spondents' complaint, holding that the statute violated Mis-
sissippi's constitutional bar against local legislation. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, striking only the spe-
cific reference to Highways 14 and 15 and upholding the re-
maining requirement that, "in any county in which a munici-
pal separate school district embraces the entire county," each 
supervisors district must elect one trustee. Lovorn v. 
Hathorn, 365 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1979) (en bane). The court 
then "remanded to the chancery court for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with [its] opinion." Id., at 952. 
The local officials, petitioners here, filed a petition for re-
hearing, in which they argued for the first time that the 
Chancery Court could not implement the reformed statute 
until the change had been precleared under § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion without comment, and this Court denied a petition for a 
writ of certiorari. 441 U. S. 946 (1979). 
On remand, the Chancery Court ordered an election pursu-
ant to the redacted statute. The court set out detailed pro-
cedures governing the election, including the requirement 
school, incorporating the same, or granting such school any privileges. 
3 The voters initially filed their suit in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Mississippi. That court stayed federal pro-
ceedings to give the Mississippi courts an opportunity to construe the state 
statute at issue. Record 320. In 1979, pursuant to a notice of voluntary 
dismissal by stipulation, the court dismissed the federal action without 
prejudice. Record 323. 
' The voters also charged that the electoral system then in force violated 
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that "[i]f no candidate receives a majority of the vote cast at 
any of said elections ... , a runoff election shall be held . . . 
between the two candidates receiving the highest vote [in the 
first election.]" Record 143. The court derived the latter 
requirement from Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-217 (Supp. 1981), 
which mandates runoffs in elections conducted under 
§ 37-7-203(1). See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-209 (Supp. 1981). 
The Chancery Court also agreed ·with petitioners' claim that 
the changes in election procedures fell within § 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, and directed petitioners to submit the elec-
tion plan to the United States Attorney General for 
preclearance. Record 141, 146-147. 5 
Upon review of petitioners' submission, the Attorney Gen-
eral objected to the proposed change in election procedure 
"insofar as it incorporate[d] a majority vote requirement." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-8. Because of the substantial black 
population in Winston County, 6 an apparent pattern of ra-
cially polarized voting in the county, and the historical ab-
sence of blacks from various local governing boards, the At-
torney General concluded that the runoff procedure could 
have a discriminatory effect. Ibid. · 
Respondents attempted to overcome this obstacle by both 
joining the Attorney General as a defendant and persuading 
• As we have explained on numerous occasions, covered jurisdictions 
may satisfy § 5 by submitting proposed changes to the Attorney General. 
If the Attorney General objects to the proposal, the jurisdiction may either 
request reconsideration ::ir seek a declaratory judgment from the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. A covered jurisdiction, 
of course, also may seek a declaratory judgment in the first instance, omit-
ting submission to the Attorney General. See generally Blanding Y. 
DuBose, 454 U.S. -- (1982); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 
u. s. 544 , 548-550 (1969). 
6 At that time, the Attorne)' General noted, blacks constituted approxi-
mately 39% of the Winston County population but were not a majority in 
any of the districts from which trustees were to be elected. 
' The Attorney General also observed that the Winston County school 
district appears to be the only county-\\ide district in which Mississippi re-
quires runoff elections. 
-
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the Chancery Court to hold the election without the runoff 
procedure. The court, however, refused to join the Attor-
ney General and held that state law unambiguously required 
runoff elecd ons. Buffeted by apparently conflicting state 
and federal statutes, the Chancery Court concluded that its 
decree calli ng for an election would "remain in force subject 
to compliance ·with the Federal Voters Right Act [sic] as pre-
viously ordered by this Court." Record 342. 
Failing to obtain an election from the Chancery Court, re-
spondents once again appealed to the Mississippi Supreme 
Court. That court observed that its "prior decision, which 
the United States Supreme Court declined to reverse or alter 
in any respect, became and is the law of the case." Carter v. 
Luke, 399 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Miss. 1981). The court ex-
plained that because the prior decision upheld a statute ref er-
ring to the statute requiring runoffs, and because both par-
ties had agreed during oral argument to abide by the runoff 
procedure, the Chancery Court properly enforced the law re-
quiring runoffs and improperly conditioned the election on 
compliance ·with the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Chan-
cery Court's decree referring to the Voting Rights Act and 
"remanded ·with directions for the lower court to call and re-
quire the holding of an election." 399 So. 2d, at 1358. We 
granted certiorari to decide whether the Mississippi Supreme 
Court properly ordered the election without insuring compli-
ance with federal law. 454 U. S. -- (1981). 8 
• Shortly before petitioners filed their petition for certiorari , the Chan-
cery Court set an election for December 5, 1981. That court, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court , and this Court denied motions to stay the election. 
See 454 U. S. 1070 (1981). On December 1, the United States filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, 
seeking to enjoin implementation of the voting change involved in this case. 
The District Court refused to issue a temporary restraining order and has 
not taken any other action. 
The December 5 election was held as scheduled. Although the record 
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Before addressing the federal question raised by the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court's decision, we must consider respond-
ents' assertion that the lower court decision rests upon two 
adequate and independent state grounds. First, respond-
ents contend that the state court's reliance upon the law of 
the case bars review of the federal question. It has long 
been established, however, that "[ w]e have jurisdiction to 
consider all of the substantial federal questions determined in 
the earlier stages of [state proceedings], ... and our right to 
re-examine such questions is not affected by a ruling that the 
first decision of the state court became the law of the case. 
... " Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 87 (1955). See also 
Davis v. O'Hara, 266 U. S. 314, 321 (1924); United States v. 
Denver & Rio Grande R . Co., 191 U. S. 84, 93 (1903). Be-
cause we cannot review a state court judgment until it is fi-
nal, 9 a contrary rule would insulate interlocutory state court 
rulings on important federal questions from our 
consideration. 
The same concerns, of course, do not apply when a prior 
state decision was subject to review here. Under those cir-
cumstances, a state court's subsequent reliance upon the law 
of the case may preclude our review. 10 In this case, how-
ever, the Mississippi Supreme Court's first decision plainly 
us that a runoff election was held in at least one district. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae 10, n. 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. 
"28 U. S. C. § 1257; O'Dell v. E spinoza, 456 U. S. -- (1982); Market 
Street R . Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 
(1945). 
'
0 SeeRio Grande ·western R . Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915). 
Some scholars have questioned the scope of R io Grande, suggesting that 
the decision may have turned upon the peculiar circumstance that both the 
first and second state court judgments were before the Court at the same 
time. See R. Stem & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 192 (5th ed. 
1978). We need not explore this suggestion because we conclude that the 
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was not final. The court's remand "for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with [its] opinion," Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 
So. 2d 947, 952 (Miss. 1979) (en bane), together with its fail-
ure to address expressly the Voting Rights Act issue, sug-
gested that the Chancery Court could still consider the fed-
eral issue on remand. Indeed, the Chancery Court 
interpreted its mandate in precisely this manner. u Because 
the Mississippi Supreme Court's first decision did not, at the 
time it was rendered, appear to be subject to our reYiew, the 
court's subsequent invocation of the law of the case does not 
prevent us from reviev.ring federal questions determined in 
the first appeal. 
Respondents also argue that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court pretermitted consideration of the Voting Rights Act 
because petitioners' reliance upon the issue in a petition for 
rehearing was untimely. We have recognized that the fail-
ure to comply with a state procedural rule may constitute an 
independent and adequate state ground barring our review of 
a federal question. 12 Our decisions, however, stress that a 
state procedural ground is not "adequate" unless the proce-
dural rule is "strictly or regularly followed." Barr v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149 (1964). State courts may not 
avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules 
that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims. 
Even if we construe the Mississippi Supreme Court's denial 
of petitioners' petition for rehearing as the silent application 
of a procedural bar, we cannot conclude that the state court 
consistently relies upon this rule. 
u The Chancellor, in fact, noted that it "would have been impossible to 
have submitted to the Attorney General for approval until this Court had 
set up the mechanics of the election, for until that was done , the Attorney 
General would not have the data necessary to either approve or disap-
prove." Record 90--91. 
12 E. g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512 n. 7 (1978); New York 
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Respondents cite two cases indicating that the Mississippi 
Supreme Court will consider an issue raised for the first time 
in a petition for rehearing "[o]nly in exceptional cases." New 
& Hughes Drilling Co. v. Smith, 219 So. 2d 657, 661 (Miss. 
1969); Rigdon v. General Box Co., 249 Miss. 239, 246, 162 So. 
2d 863, 864 (1964). Although these opinions may summarize 
the court's practice prior to 1969, we have been unable to find 
any more recent decisions repeating or applying the rule. 13 
On the contrary, the Mississippi Supreme Court now regu-
larly grants petitions for rehearing ·without mentioning any 
restrictions on its authority to consider issues raised for the 
first time in the petitions. 14 
13 In New & Hughes Drilling Co. itself, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
permitted an exception to the alleged rule barring review of questions 
raised for the first time on rehearing. A case decided the same year as 
New & Hughes Drilling Co. is the most recent decision we have found that 
might have actually applied the procedural rule described by respondents. 
See Leake County Cooperative v. Dependents of Barrett , 226 So. 2d 608, 
614-616 (Miss. 1969). Even that decision, however, may have rested upon 
a special rule involving waiver of defects in venue. 
Neither the Mississippi Code nor the Rules of the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi embody the alleged prohibition against presentation of new issues 
in petitions for rehearing. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
know whether the Mississippi Supreme Court still adheres to the rule , ap-
plying it silently, or whether the court has abandoned the rule. 
"See, e.g., Cortez v. Brown, 408 So. 2d 464 (Miss. 1981) (en bane); Cash 
v. Illinois Central Gu(( R . Co., 388 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 1980) (en bane); 
McKee v. McKee, 382 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1980) (en bane); City of Jackson v. 
Capital R eporter Publishing Co., 373 So. 2d 802 (Miss. 1979) (en bane); R e-
alty Title Guaranty Co. v. Howard, 355 So. 2d 657 (Miss. 1978) (en bane); 
Couch v. Martinez, 357 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1978) (en bane); Foster v. Foster, 
344 So. 2d 460 (Miss. 1977) (en bane); McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897 
(Miss. 1977) (en bane); Daniels v. State, 341 So. 2d 918 (Miss. 1977) (en 
bane); Mississippi State H ighway Commission v. Gresham, 323 So. 2d 
100, 103 (Miss. 1975) (en bane); Powers v. Malley, 302 So. 2d 262, 264 
(Miss. 1974). 
In Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Gresham , supra, the court 
expressly noted that its disposition depended upon a fact mentioned for the 
first time in the petition for rehearing. In several other decisions, the 
-
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One particular decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
decided only last year, demonstrates that the court does not 
consistently preclude consideration of issues raised for the 
first time on rehearing. In Quinn v. Branning, 404 So. 2d 
1018 (Miss. 1981), the court held that part of a criminal stat-
ute violated the state constitution's prohibition against local 
legislation. Striking the offensive language, the court ap-
proved the rest of the statute and affirmed the underlying 
conviction. The defendant then petitioned for rehearing, 
pointing out that the affidavit against him did not allege a 
crime under the reformed statute. The court agreed with 
this contention, granted the petition in part, and reversed 
the conviction, all without mentioning the rule against consid-
eration of new issues on rehearing. The striking similarity 
between this case and Quinn, both involving issues that the 
parties could have foreseen but that arose with urgency only 
after the court upheld part of a challenged statute, persuades 
us that the Mississippi Supreme Court is not "strictly or reg-
ularly" following a procedural rule so as to preclude review of 
issues raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. 
The denial of rehearing in this case, although not appearing 
sufficiently final to permit our immediate review, rriust have 
rested either upon a substantive rejection of petitioners' fed-
eral claim or upon a procedural rule that the state court ap-
plies only irregularly. 10 Thus, there are no independent and 
type of question considered on rehearing suggests that it was raised for the 
first time by the party petitioning for that relief. E . g., Cortez v. Brown, 
supra; City of Jackson"· Capital Reporter Publish ing Co., supra ; Powers 
v. Malley, supra . These decisions, however, do not expressly acknowl-
edge the novelty of the points raised on rehearing. 
15 Respondents also contend that our decisions establish a general rule 
against review of questions presented for the first time in a petition for re-
hearing. We have recognized that , under many circumstances, "[q)ues-
tions first presented to the highest State court on a petition for rehearing 
come too late for consideration here." Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. John-
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adequate state grounds barring our review of the federal 
issue. 
II 
Respondents do not dispute that the change in election pro-
cedures ordered by the Mississippi courts is subject to 
preclearance under § 5. 16 They urge, however, that the Vot-
plained that this bar does not apply if "the State court exerted its jurisdic-
tion in such a way that the case could have been brought here had the 
questions been raised prior to the original disposition." Ibid. In this case 
we conclude that the Mississippi Supreme Court's first judgment on appeal 
either decided the federal question on the merits, although in a manner 
that did not appear final, or avoided the federal question by invoking an 
inconsistently applied procedural rule. If petitioners had made their claim 
prior to the court's original disposition , either of these circumstances would 
have permitted us to review the federal question. 
16 Mississippi plainly is one of the jurisdictions covered by the statute. 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 318 (1966); 30 Fed. Reg. 
9897 (1965). The Louisville School District Board of Trustees, like all po-
litical entities within the State, accordingly must comply with § S's stric-
tures. See Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 
46 (1978); United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 
110 (1978). It is immaterial that the change sought by respondents de-
rives from a statute that predates the Voting Rights Act, because § 5 
comes into play whenever a covered jurisdiction departs from an election 
procedure that was "in fact 'in force or effect' ... on November 1, 1964." 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 395 (1971) (emphasis original). 
Finally, the presence of a court decree does not exempt the contested 
change from § 5. We held only last Term that § 5 applies to any change 
"reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people," 
even if a judicial decree constrains those choices. McDaniel v. Sanchez , 
452 U. S. 130, 153 (1981). Although McDan iel involved a reapportion-
ment plan drafted pursuant to a federal court's order, its interpretation of 
§ 5 is equally instructive here. When state or local officials comply with a 
court order to enforce a state statute, there is no doubt that their actions 
"reflec[t] the policy choices of ... elected representatives." Indeed, if§ 5 
did not encompass this situation, covered jurisdictions easily could evade 
the statute by declining to implement new state statutes until ordered to 
do so by state courts. Cf. McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, at 151 (noting that 
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ing Rights Act deprives state courts of the power even to de-
cide whether § 5 applies to a proposed change in voting proce-
dures. Ii Under their analysis of the Act, a state court asked 
to implement a change in the State's voting laws could not in-
quire whether the change was subject to § 5. Even if the 
change plainly fell within § 5, the court would have to ignore 
that circumstance and enter a decree violating federal law. 
Both the language and purposes of the Voting Rights Act re-
fute this notion. 
Only last Term we summarized the principles governing 
state court jurisdiction to decide federal issues. Gulf Off-
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473 (1981). We be-
gin, in every case, "·with the presumption that state courts 
enjoy concurrent jurisdiction" over those claims. Id., at 4 78. 
Only "an explicit statutory directive, [an] unmistakable impli-
cation from legislative history, or ... a clear incompatibility 
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests" will 
rebut the presumption. Ibid. Most important for our pur-
poses, even a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
claims arising under a federal statute usually "will not pre-
vent a state court from deciding a federal question collater-
ally." Id., at 483 n. 12. 
Respondents rest their jurisdictional argument on three 
sections of the Act. Section 14(b) provides that "[n]o court 
other than the District Court for the District of Columbia ... 
shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pur-
suant to . . . section 5. . .. " 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973l(b). We have already held, however, that this provi-
awaiting litigation challenging a refusal to redistrict after a census is com-
pleted, [§ 5) might have the unintended effect of actually encouraging delay 
in making obviously needed changes in district boundaries"). In light of 
McDaniel, we conclude that a state comi decree directing compliance \\ith 
a state election statute contemplates "administ[ration]" of the state statute 
within the meaning of § 5. 
"Respondents do not claim that Mississippi law restricts its courts' 
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sion governs only declaratory judgments approving proposed 
changes in voting procedure. Other courts may decide the 
distinct question of whether a proposed change is subject to 
the Act. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 
544, 557-560 (1969); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130 
(1981). 
Sections 5 and 12(f) of the Act provide somewhat stronger 
support for respondents' claim. Section 5 provides that 
"[a]ny action under this section shall be heard and deter-
mined by a court of three judges in accordance with the pro-
visions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code," 
79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, while § 12(f) declares that 
"[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdic-
tion of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section." 79 
Stat. 444, 42 U.S. C. § 1973j(f). 1• It is possible that these 
sections grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
"action[s] under" § 5 or "proceedings instituted pursuant" to 
§ 12. 19 We need not resolve that question in this case, how-
ever, because respondents' state suit fell within neither of 
these categories. Instead, respondents' initial suit was an 
action to compel compliance with a forgotten state law. 20 
Nothing in § 5 or § 12 negates the presumption that, at least 
when the issue arises collaterally, state courts may decide 
whether a proposed change in election procedure requires 
preclearance under § 5. 
The policies of the Act support the same result. 21 The 
1
~ Section 12 authorizes preventive relief against persons "engaged or 
. . . about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by" designated sec-
tions of the Voting Rights Act. 79 Stat. 444 , 42 U. S. C. § 1973j(d). 
1
• At least one state court has ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Voting Rights Act. Ortiz v. Thompson , 604 S. W. 2d 
443 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980). See also Beatty v. Esposito, 411 F. Supp . 
107 (EDNY 1976) (finding that state court lacked jurisdiction to decide § 5 
issue, without explaining whether state suit arose under the Voting Rights 
Act). 
20 Respondents also based their suit on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See n. 4 supra . 
-
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Voting Rights Act "implemented Congress' firm intention to 
rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 548 (1969). Fearing 
that covered jurisdictions would exercise their ingenuity to 
devise new and subtle forms of discrimination, Congress pro-
hibited those jurisdictions from implementing any change in 
voting procedure ·without obtaining preclearance under § 5. 
Granting state courts the power to decide, as a collateral 
matter, whether § 5 applies to contemplated changes in elec-
tion procedures will help insure compliance ·with the 
preclearance scheme. 22 Approval of this limited jurisdiction 
also avoids placing state courts in the uncomfortable position 
of ordering voting changes that they suspect, but cannot de-
termine, should be precleared under § 5. Accordingly, we 
hold that the Mississippi courts had the power to decide 
whether § 5 applied to the change sought by respondents. 
21 Neither the parties nor the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, 
has cited any legislative history bearing upon state court jurisdiction to de-
cide issues arising under the Voting Rights Act. 
22 As respondents point out , state court jurisdiction to decide these collat-
eral issues is not absolutely necessary to effectuate the Act's scheme, be-
cause interested parties have the ability to seek relief from a federal dis-
trict court. Recognition of a limited state power to address § 5 issues, 
however, furthers the Act's ameliorative purposes by permitting additional 
tribunals to enforce its commands. It also ensures that the question of 
coverage \\ill be addressed at the earliest possible time, without requiring 
duplicative lawsuits. 
We find little force in respondents' claim that , if the state courts possess 
jurisdiction to decide § 5 issues arising in disputes between private parties, 
they \\ill frustrate the Attorney General 's enforcement of the Act by inter-
preting the preclearance requirement conservatively. The Attorney Gen-
eral is not bound by the resolution of§ 5 issues in cases to which he was not 
a party. City of R ichmond\'. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 373-374 n. 6 
(1975). Common notions of collateral estoppel suggest that the state pro-
ceedings similarly would not bind other interested persons who did not par-
ticipate in them. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977). Persons dissatisfied with a state court's col-
lateral resolution of a § 5 issue in proceedings invoking other parties, 
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If the Mississippi courts had the power to make this deter-
mination, then it is clear that they also had the duty to do so. 
"State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional ob-
ligation ... to uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 494 n. 35 (1976) (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816)). Section 5 declares that 
whenever a covered jurisdiction shall "enact or seek to ad-
minister any ... standard, practice, or procedure ·with re-
spect to voting different from that in force or effect on No-
vember 1, 1964," see n. 1, supra, it must obtain either 
preclearance from the Attorney General or a declaratory 
judgment from the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Our opinions repeatedly note that failure 
to follow either of these routes renders the change unenforce-
able. See, e. g., Dougherty County Board of Education v. 
White, 439 U. S. 32, 46 (1978); United States v. Board of Su-
pervisors, 429 U. S. 642, 645 (1977) (per curiam). When a 
party to a state proceeding asserts that § 5 renders the con-
templated relief unenforceable, therefore, the state court 
must examine the claim and refrain from ordering relief that 
would violate federal law. 23 
V 
Our holding mandates reversal of the lower court judg-
ment. Under our analysis, the change in election procedure 
is subject to § 5, see n. 16 supra, and the Mississippi courts 
may not further implement that change until the parties com-
ply with § 5. At this time, however, we need not decide 
whether petitioners are entitled to any additional relief. 
23 Our holding does not prevent state courts from attempting to 
accomodate both state and federal interests. A state court, for example, 
might adopt the approach followed by the Chancery Court in this case, and 
order the parties to submit the proposed relief to the Attorney General. 
If the Attorney General registers an objection, the court might then order 
the parties to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the 




HATHORN r. LOVORN 
-
15 
The United States has initiated a federal suit challenging the 
change at issue here, see n. 8 supra, and we agree with the 
Solicitor General that the District Court entertaining that 
suit should address the problem of relief in the first instance. 
As we noted in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 395-397 
(1971), a local District Court is in a better position than this 
Court to fashion relief, because the District Court "is more 
familiar with the nuances of the local situation" and has the 
opportunity to hear eYidence. Id., at 397. In this case, the 
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi will be 
better able to decide whether a special election is necessary, 
whether a more moderate form of interim relief will satisfy 
§ 5, 24 or whether new elections are so imminent that special 
relief is inappropriate. We hold only that the Mississippi 
courts must withhold further implementation of the disputed 
change in election procedures until the parties demonstrate 
compliance with § 5. 
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
"'For example, since the Attorney General objected only to the runoff 
procedure, the District Court simply might void the results of any runoff 
elections, permitting the candidates who gathered a plurality of votes in 
the general election to take those seats. We, of course, intimate no view 
on the best form of relief, leaving that matter to the District Court's 
discretion. 
- -
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: JUM 3 lifl2 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-451 
RALPH HATHORN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
MRS. BOBBY LOVORN ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MISSISSIPPI 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
The provisions of§§ 5, 12(f), and 14(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act, referred to in the opinion of the Court, ante, at 11-12, 
convince me that Congress did not intend the state courts to 
play a role in the enforcement of that Act. In Gulf Offshore 
Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473 (1981), upon which the 
Court heavily relies for its contrary conclusion, we said: 
"The factors generally recommending exclusive federal-
court jurisdiction over an area of federal law include the 
desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of 
federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater 
hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims." 
Id., at 483-484 (footnotes omitted). 
It seems to me that each of these factors counsels in favor of 
exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, and I do not understand 
the Court to contend otherwise. 
From a practical point of view, I think the Court's decision 
is bound to breed conflicts between the state courts and the 
federal District Courts sitting within the states, each of 
which may now determine whether or not a particular voting 
change must be pre-cleared with the Attorney General before 
being enforced in a covered jurisdiction. Indeed, the precur-
sor of such conflict may well be found in the Court's conclud-
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ing observations that the District Court for the Northern 
District of Mississippi, in which the United States has pend-
ing a suit pertaining to the change involved in this case, 
should proceed to make determinations under the Voting 
Rights Act before the state court whose judgment we are re-
viewing renders further remedy in this case. Exactly what 
is to be left to the States, under this construction, is more 
than a little problematical. 
I do not think that the goals of the Voting Rights Act will 
be materially advanced by the Court's somewhat tortured ef-
fort to make the state courts a third line of enforcement for 
the Act, after the District of Columbia courts and other fed-
eral District Courts. The principal effect of today's decision 
will be to enable one or the other of parties such as those in-
volved in this case, neither of whom were intended to be pri-
mary beneficiaries of the Voting Rights Act, to employ the 
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